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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
DECENCY REQUIREMENT IN ART FUNDING
NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998)
Amy Petrick***
Petitioner, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA),' denied2 grants
to Respondents, four performance artists,3 because the artists did not meet
statutory4 requirements to comport themselves with general standards of
decency and respect for American values.' Respondents challenged the
NEA's decision, alleging that the "general standards of decency" 6 criteria
violated their First Amendment rights by discriminating on the basis of

* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Spring 1998.
** This comment is dedicated to Sage and Joe for their love, patience, and support.
1. Congress created the NEA in 1965 as part of the National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities to help create a climate "encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, [and]
inquiry and the material conditions facilitating the release of... creative talent." 20 U.S.C.
§ 951(7) (1994).
2. An advisory panel initially reviewed grants for the four artists and recommended
approval of all four grant applications. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 2174 (1998)
[hereinafter Finley III]. John Frohnmayer, then Chairperson of the NEA, requested that three
of the applications be reviewed again, and the advisory panel again recommended approval
of all four applications. See id. at 2173-74. The National Council of the Arts, a 26-member
council responsible for reviewing the advisory panel's recommendations and advising the
Chairperson, subsequently recommended disapproval of the four grants. See id. at 2172, 2174.
The Chairperson has the authority to award grants but may not approve an application that has
been recommended for disapproval by the National Council for the Arts. See id. at 2172.
Consequently, the Chairperson denied all four grants on recommendation of the National
Council for the Arts. See id.at 2174.
3. The four performance artists, Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim
Miller, originally sought restoration of their grants or reconsideration of their applications.
See id. at 2174. They were later joined by the National Association of Artists' Organizations
(NAOO) and amended their complaint to include the constitutional challenge to the validity
of § 954(d)(1). See id.
4. The statute, 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1), requires the NEA Chairperson to consider "general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public"
in applying criteria by which applications are judged. Id.
5. See Finley III, 118 S.Ct. at 2174.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
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viewpoint. 7 The District Court for the Central District of California found
in favor of Respondents, granting summary judgment and enjoining
enforcement of the provision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's decision, holding that the provision discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint and was void for vagueness.9 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari, reversed the circuit court's holding, and HELD that the
statute was constitutional because it did not discriminate against a particular
viewpoint and was not likely to burden the applicants' right to free speech.'°
Under traditional First Amendment analysis, courts subject statutes that
criminalize or otherwise prohibit expressive activity to a. strict scrutiny
test." However, there are cases where a statute does not directly prohibit
free speech, but merely limits funding for certain speech. In such cases, the
Court has struggled to balance its traditional zealous protection of individual
First Amendment rights with its longstanding 12judicial deference to congressional authority in setting spending priorities.
When initially faced with First Amendment challenges in the funding
context, the Court took the position that legislative spending power could not
be used to suppress unpopular speech, favor one viewpoint over another,
punish unpopular ideas, or condition a benefit on relinquishing the right to
free speech.13 The Court's broad prohibition against using legislative
spending power to discriminate based on content was set forth as early as
1946 in Hannegan v. Esquire.'4 In Hannegan, the Court denounced the
denial of a second class mail rate to a periodical based on its content as
"censorship... abhorrent to our traditions. ' 5

7. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Finley I],
afftd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Finley II], rev'd, Finley II1, 118 S.Ct. at
2168.
8. See id. at 1476.
9. See Finley II, 100 F.3d at 684.
10. See Finley III, 118 S. Ct. at 2180.
11. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2344-45 (1997) (applying a strict scrutiny
standard to a statute criminalizing the transmission of indecent materials to minors via the
Internet). The strict scrutiny standard requires at a minimum that a statute serve a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See id.
12. See Finley III, 118 S.Ct. at 2171-73.
13. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31
(1995) (holding that a university may not deny funds to a student newspaper because of its
Christian perspective and noting that viewpoint discrimination is an egregious form of content
discrimination that cannot be tolerated); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991)
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that while an individual is
not entitled to a government benefit, once the government offers a benefit, it cannot condition
the benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right)); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (noting that Congress may not discriminate in
awarding subsidies in order to suppress dangerous ideas).
14. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
15. Id. at 151.
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However, recent caselaw demonstrates the Court's increasing reluctance
to invalidate spending schemes as violative of individual constitutional
rights.' 6 The Court's decision in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington illustrates this trend.' 7 In Regan, the Court held that Congress
had the authority to withhold a tax exemption to a group that engaged in
lobbying activities. 8 The Regan opinion underscored the Court's deference
to legislative authority to set spending priorities, noting that the legislature
is uniquely positioned to know local spending needs and the Court should be
reluctant to question congressional spending decisions. 9 By rejecting the
strict scrutiny test in favor of a rational relation test, 20 the Regan Court
greatly relaxed the standards by which restrictions on expressive activity are
judged in a funding context, thereby expanding congressional authority to
condition and restrict funded speech.2 '
The Regan decision also departed from the traditional ban on content
discrimination by announcing that content restrictions are permissible in the
form of statutory classifications.22 While the Court acknowledged that
Congress could not use legislative spending power to censor individual
messages, 23 the Court implied that content-related restrictions were permissible where they served a rational purpose unrelated to the suppression of
speech.24
The Court continued its expansive reading of legislative authority to

16. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (holding that Congress has the authority to require
doctors working for Title X programs to refrain from abortion counseling in the course of
providing services to patients, and upholding congressional authority to selectively fund certain
expressive activities but not others).
17. 461 U.S. at 548.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 547 (citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940)).
20. The rational relation test is less rigorous than the traditional strict scrutiny test,
requiring only that a statute bear a "rational relation" to a legitimate state interest. Id. While
courts will inquire as to whether a statute is tailored to meet the specific objective served, the
rational relation test does not contain a stringent requirement that the least restrictive means
available be used. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989)
(upholding a city ordinance that required users of a public park's band shell to use city-owned
amplification equipment when holding concerts in the band shell).
21. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-49 (holding that Congress may deny a tax exemption to
a group based on lobbying activities). The Regan Court acknowledged that the Court of
Appeals required a strict scrutiny test because the statute affects First Amendment rights on
a discriminatory basis, but held that a rational relation test was a more appropriate standard
based on relevant caselaw. See id.
22. See id. at 548.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 550. "Where governmental provision of subsidies is not '"aimed at the
suppression of dangerous ideas"' ... its 'power to encourage actions deemed to be in the
public interest is necessarily far broader.'" Id. (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 513 (1959); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977), respectively).
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condition funded speech in Rust v. Sullivan.25 In Rust, the Court decided
that Congress may prohibit doctors who receive Title X funds from
counseling patients about their option to obtain an abortion.2 6 The Rust
Court announced that, while Congress may not discriminate in order to
suppress a particular viewpoint, Congress has the authority to selectively fund
one speech act over another.27 The Court further decided that the
prohibition against abortion counseling did not condition the funding benefit
on the waiver of a constitutional right because doctors could choose to speak
about abortion outside of the funded program.2 s
The Rust decision expanded the focus on congressional intent implicit in
the Regan decision and virtually overturned the general rule that Congress
may not discriminate against particular viewpoints when setting spending
priorities. 29 However, the narrow margin 3 0 and strong dissent 3' in Rust
suggest the Court's unease with abandoning the strict judicial scrutiny
typically required by the First Amendment out of deference for Congress'
autonomy in setting spending priorities.32
While recent caselaw establishes a relaxation of strict judicial scrutiny as
to content discrimination in a funding context, the requirement that a statute
be narrowly tailored to meet its objective remains undisturbed. 33 Two
doctrines that might have application in the funding context have evolved out
of the Court's requirement that statutes be narrowly tailored to serve a
legitimate state purpose: the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines.34
The overbreadth doctrine invalidates a statute that reaches more protected
speech than is necessary in order to serve the legitimate purpose for which

25. 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
26. See id. at 198.
27. See id. at 193.
28. See id. at 199. It should be noted that the Court's refusal to strike down the funding
condition on speech is particularly dramatic because of the fundamental nature of a doctorpatient relationship and the implicit restriction on a woman's ability to exercise her right to
privacy as to procreative decisions. See id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the
physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make informed choices).
29. See id. at 194 (rationalizing the prohibition against abortion counseling as a provision
that does not suppress dangerous ideas, but merely prohibits expressive activities outside the
project's scope); see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 (asserting that congressional selection of
particular entities for entitlements is a matter of policy and discretion not subject to judicial
review unless under exceptional circumstances).
30. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 176 (5-4 margin).
31. See id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent
by Justice Marshall. See id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined Parts
H1and III, and Justice O'Connor joined Part I. See id. at 203-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 177-203.
33. See id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346 (requiring
that a statute use the least restrictive means available to accomplish a legitimate state purpose).
34. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
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it was enacted." The vagueness doctrine strikes down statutory language
as void where a person of ordinary intelligence must guess at the meaning
of the statute, thus intending to avoid the possibility that potential speakers
will refrain from protected speech for fear of sanction.3 6 The vagueness
doctrine also applies where administrators of the law, who are unable to
discern an objective standard by which to apply the law, create unbridled
administrative discretion and uneven application of the law.37
Both the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines were applied recently
in Reno v. ACLU.38 The Reno Court invalidated a law that criminalized the
transmission of indecent information to minors over the Internet. 39 The
Court determined that, while the law served a legitimate state purpose by
restricting a minor's access to indecent materials, the statutory language was
overbroad, reaching many protected speech acts.' The Court also found the
language of the law to be impermissibly vague because the word "indecent"
is not easily defined and potentially chills speech as speakers might fear that
a judge would later find that their speech fell within the sanctioned
category. 4' While Reno shows that the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines retain their vitality in the criminal context, the decision does not
determine whether the doctrines are applicable in a funding context. 42
In the instant case, the Court chose to leave unexplored possible
applications of the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines in the funding
context.43 Instead, by engaging in creative statutory interpretation, the
Court continued its trend of upholding legislative conditions on funded
speech, thereby validating the NEA's "decency and respect" criteria." In
affirming the validity of the statute, the majority reasoned that the statute
may be read as merely advisory,45 thus requiring only that the NEA

35. See Finley 11, 118 S. Ct. at 2194 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982)) (noting that the Court has defined a law as substantially overbroad
when it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications).
36. See Finley II, 100 F.3d at 675 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-09 (1972)) (holding that the void for vagueness doctrine requires that a person of ordinary
intelligence have a reasonable opportunity to know what is being prohibited, and there must
be explicit standards for those who are to apply it).
37. See id. (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09).
38. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
39. See id. at 2351.
40. See id. at 2348.
41. See id. at 2344.
42. See id. at 2344-45 (noting the importance of the statute's criminal prohibition in
applying the vagueness standard).
43. See Finley III, 118 S. Ct. at 2178-80 (deciding that while vagueness in a statute might
cause artists to conform their speech in an effort to predict funding decisions, where the
government acts as patron, this result is not "constitutionally severe").
44. Id. at 2176.
45. See id.
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Chairperson consider "general standards of decency" and "respect for diverse
beliefs and values of the American public" in evaluating grant applications. 46 Additionally, the majority maintained that, because the terms
"decency," "respect," and "diverse values of the American public" can be
read to include virtually all speech, the requirement to consider these
standards does not discriminate against a particular viewpoint. 7 Further,
the majority identified several contexts in which the "decency" and "respect"
criteria could serve a purpose other than the suppression of a particular
viewpoint.4 Noting the widespread use of vague and subjective criteria in
the funding context, 49 the Court maintained that an as-applied challenge 0
was required to establish the statute's abridgement of free speech.5
Both the concurrence 52 and the dissent53 criticized the majority's
interpretation of the statute as insensible, reading the statute as plainly
requiring discrimination against those viewpoints that further "indecent"
perspectives and those perspectives that show disrespect for American
values.54 Justice Scalia argued that viewpoint discrimination is "perfectly
constitutional. 5 5 Conversely, Justice Souter argued in dissent that, while a

46. Id. at 2171.
47. Id. at 2176-77.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 2179-80 (noting that scholarship programs, such as the Congressional Award
Program and the National Endowment for the Humanities, use vague terms like "excellence"
in their application criteria).
50. The term "as-applied challenge" refers to a cause of action where the petitioner asserts
that the challenged statute is being applied in an unconstitutional manner. Id. at 2178. A
"facial challenge" occurs where the claimant asserts that the statute is incapable of being
applied in a manner consistent with- the Constitution. Id. at 2194 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(noting that First Amendment challenges constitute an exception to the stringent requirements
for facial constitutional challenges under the overbreadth doctrine).
51. See id. at 2178-79.
52. See id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 2183-84 (Scalia, J., concurring), 2186-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that an individual's right to
free speech is always protected because the individual may refuse government benefits and
engage in the restricted activity. See id. at 2182-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). This application
of First Amendment principles would completely reverse the Court's earlier consensus that
Congress may not condition the receipt of a benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally
protected right. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (holding that while
an individual is not entitled to a government benefit, once the government offers a benefit, it
cannot condition the benefit on an infringement of a constitutional right)). Furthermore, this
argument does not sufficiently recognize the prominence of NEA funding in the art world.
See Finley II1, 118 S. Ct. at 2195 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bella Lewitzky Dance
Found. v. Frohnnayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1991)). For many artists, NEA
approval is essential to obtaining the resources needed to sustain their craft. See id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) (stating that the NEA holds a dominant and influential role in the. financial
affairs of the U.S. art world, and that NEA approval often lends artists the legitimacy and
prestige needed to obtain private funding).
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speaker does not have a constitutional entitlement to government funding,
where the government chooses to fund an expressive activity, it may not
56
,
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
While the instant case appears to extend congressional authority to
restrict funded speech, its potential impact is unclear because the majority
relies on weak reasoning and technical distinctions in upholding the
statute.57 For example, although the majority suggests that no burdens will
be created by the statutory criteria," the concurrence and dissent agree that
not only will the criteria have the practical effect of restricting disfavored
speech, but the criteria were enacted for exactly that purpose. 59 In fact, the
majority acknowledges that the decency provision was motivated by public
outcry over the funding of controversial artists, such as Robert Mapplethorpe
and Andres Serrano. 6°
The public outcry and subsequent congressional debate confirm that the
plain purpose of the amendment in question was to avoid future funding of
similarly controversial aft.6' For this reason, the instant decision represents
a virtual abandonment of the Court's general prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination.6 2 The Court's strained statutory interpretation shows that it
will go to great lengths to construct a nondiscriminatory reading of a statute
out of deference to the legislature, even when the legislative history clearly
shows the purpose of the spending scheme is to favor certain speech
activities and restrict others. 63
Significant also is the Court's refusal to consider whether the provision
serves a legitimate state interest or is in keeping with the general purpose of
the funding scheme. By refusing to consider how a general decency standard
furthers the NEA's avowed purpose to encourage expressive activity and
create a climate that fosters creativity, the Court rejected application of even
the relaxed rational'relation standard set forth in Regan and implicitly applied
in Rust.64

56. See id. at 2191 (Souter, J. dissenting).
57. See id. at 2168-80.
58. See id. at 2177.
59. See id. at 2180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring), 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 2172.
61. See id. at 2172-73.
62. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 (stating that granting the state the power to
examine forms of expression and to classify them or deny them resources based on their
content creates a danger to liberty).
63. CompareFinley III, 118 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (finding that general standards of decency
do not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint), with Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (finding that a
limitation on transmitting indecent material to minors was a content-based restriction).
64. See Finley III, 118 S. Ct. at 2196 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the irony of the
Court's decision to uphold Congress' right to deny funding to any artistic work capable of
giving offense in the context of a program designed to encourage freedom of thought); see
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Furthermore, the instant decision suggests that the Court will not apply
the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness in the funding context.6 5 The
majority ignores the premise behind the vagueness doctrine by asserting that
the subjective nature of the criteria alleviates the potential for viewpoint
discrimination.'
As the lower court pointed out, the vagueness doctrine
was created to protect against subjectivity in the application of funding requirements. 67 In the instant case, the ambiguous nature of the criteria, far
from alleviating the danger of viewpoint discrimination, creates an environment where NEA officials are able to exercise unbridled discretion without
the possibility of judicial review. 6 Such unfettered discretion will necessarily chill funded speech, as grant recipients will have to guess as to the
individual tastes of NEA officials and may refrain from more daring, truly
creative work for fear of economic reprisal. 69
However, as the concurrence points out, the impact of the majority's
decision may be limited by its reliance on fine distinctions of statutory
construction and its refusal to establish a unilateral congressional right to
selectively fund speech.70 Moreover, while the majority defends Congress'
right to fund certain speech acts but not others, it concedes that the First
Amendment restricts funding criteria that unduly burden speech. 7' However, due to the majority's weak reasoning in distinguishing between criteria
that are merely advisory and criteria that require absolute denial, future
claimants and courts will have difficulty establishing instances where freedom
of speech is unduly burdened.72
For all these reasons, the majority decision eviscerates the Court's
longstanding ban on viewpoint discrimination by narrowing the definition of
viewpoint discrimination beyond practical application. The instant decision
relegates First Amendment protection of funded art to the vagaries of the
political process, ignoring the fundamental wisdom that the First Amendment

also Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94, 199 (noting that the restricted speech fell outside the scope of
the funded program, which was designed to give limited medical services); Regan, 461 U.S.
at 548-49 (requiring that the restriction be rationally related to the purpose of the statute).
65. See Finley III, 118 S. Ct. at 2179-80.
66. See id. at 2176 (citing the Respondent's argument that the American public disagrees
about the meaning of general standards of decency as proof that realistically the criteria are
not likely to compromise First Amendment rights).
67. See Finley I1, 100 F.3d at 675 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108) (noting that "a
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to ... [civil servants charged with
executing the laws, thereby creating] the danger[] of arbitrary and discriminatory application").
68. See id.
69. See id.

70.
opinion
71.
72.

See Finley 111, 118 S. Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the majority
"sustains the constitutionality of [the statute in question] by gutting it").
See id. at 2178.
See id. at 2177.
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right to free speech is too important to be left at the mercy of political
changes. Truly creative work is often initially viewed as distasteful, and
indecency can serve a powerful communicative purpose. The instant decision
endangers truly creative work by allowing Congress to fund only those artists
who pander to political notions of decency and social acceptability.

